Deployed in South Lebanon for nearly 50 years, UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon) has played a central role in the stability of our region. Most of us have grown up with the presence of the Blue Helmets. As its mandate could potentially come to an end in late 2026, the assessment of nearly half a century of presence raises a crucial question that concerns us all: is Lebanon ready to ensure the security of the South on its own?
The Origins of UNIFIL
In 1978, following an attack led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Israeli army decided to launch an offensive aimed at pushing the PLO north of the Litani River. Following this operation, conducted from March 14 to 21, 1978, in South Lebanon—which would be named Operation Litani—the Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426, creating UNIFIL. Its initial objectives were to supervise the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore peace and security, and assist our government in re-establishing its authority in the South.
2006: A Major Turning Point for UNIFIL
Before 2006, UNIFIL had well-defined and limited missions, with a modest force of 2,000 soldiers. It essentially played a role of surveillance, liaison, and occasional support to our army.
On July 12, a cross-border attack by Hezbollah against an Israeli patrol triggered a massive military response from Israel. This attack quickly spread beyond the borders. Our country suffered thirty-three days of naval, air, and land bombardments of unprecedented intensity.
The South Lebanon governorate became the battleground between Hezbollah and Israel; the human toll was heavy, especially on our side, with several thousand deaths—mostly civilians—and nearly one million internally displaced persons.
At the end of the conflict, objectives were redefined and Resolution 1701 was adopted by the Security Council, drastically expanding UNIFIL’s plan of action.
Resolution 1701: Stronger Rules of Engagement
The mission saw its personnel multiplied, increasing from 2,000 to 15,000 soldiers. It deployed additional contingents (Spain, France, Italy) and installed a dense network of positions and bases throughout the sector.
It was now tasked with new missions: accompanying the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South and ensuring that there are no armed actors other than the State. These new directives involve reinforced patrols, continuous surveillance of the Blue Line—the demarcation line traced by the United Nations in 2000—control of sensitive areas, and massive logistical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
Resolution 1701 expanded UNIFIL’s possibilities for action: it can now use force to defend itself and to protect civilians under certain conditions. It can prevent the use of weapons in its area of operations and oppose any attempt to obstruct its freedom of movement.
Since these events, the framework has constantly evolved in a complex context, between political challenges and realities on the ground, where different entities coexist: official actors, international forces, and non-state armies. However, it is important to note that UNIFIL has carried out its mission to the best of its ability.
The Impact of UNIFIL: Stabilizing, Accompanying, Rebuilding
Positive Actions: Stabilizing, Accompanying, and Rebuilding
Since 2006, one observation is clear: between maintaining stability in South Lebanon, partnering with the Lebanese army, and its humanitarian actions, UNIFIL is on all fronts. Thus, it contributes significantly to this relative stability. Its permanent presence, patrols along the Blue Line, and the tripartite meeting between itself, the Lebanese army, and the Israeli army constitute a unique rapid-action mechanism in the event of an incident.
Its partnership with the Lebanese army has intensified over the years, and the presence of these two forces in the area of operation is more than essential. Our Lebanese Armed Forces are an official, sovereign, and indispensable actor for the UNIFIL mandate to make sense, and vice versa.
This cooperation includes multiple training programs: demining, medical assistance, logistical support… Faced with the economic crisis, the Lebanese army has weakened but remains central to the country’s sovereignty and is supported by a crucial partner.
Between 2006 and 2010, South Lebanon was littered with millions of cluster munitions. The Lebanese army, in coordination with UNIFIL, participated in the demining of vast agricultural areas, allowing for the progressive return of the population to the sector and the resumption of agricultural activities.
Otherwise, we remember the Adaisseh incident in August 2010, when a clash broke out between the Lebanese army and the Israeli army near the Blue Line. UNIFIL intervened immediately as a mediator, preventing the incident from escalating into an open conflict.
In parallel, UNIFIL built the very first United Nations naval force, the Maritime Task Force (MTF), training hundreds of Lebanese sailors and contributing to improving the country’s maritime surveillance and capabilities. Since 2006, the MTF has hailed and interrogated more than 35,000 vessels in its area of operations; 865 were identified as “suspicious” and then inspected by the Lebanese army.
The mission does not only engage militarily: it also participates in the daily life of hundreds of villages by carrying out rehabilitation work. It invests in educational programs for youth and women, and provides support to farmers and cooperatives. Thus ensuring precious support to public services, it is a discreet but indispensable humanitarian actor.
Despite Everything, UNIFIL Faces Limits in a Constrained and Politically Sensitive Mandate
It cannot operate without coordination with the Lebanese army. This framework, which respects the country’s sovereignty, limits its room for maneuver in the South. Internal disagreements highlight certain flaws: Israel often denounces the mission’s inability to prevent weapons transfers, while Lebanon accuses UNIFIL of failing to intervene against Israeli aerial violations.
In December 2018, the Israeli army launched Operation “Northern Shield” to locate and neutralize tunnels it claimed were dug from South Lebanon toward Israeli territory by Hezbollah. During this operation, at least six tunnels were discovered along the border.
In this context, UNIFIL confirmed the existence of several of these tunnels, specifically that at least two of them crossed the Blue Line, in violation of Resolution 1701 which prohibits any unauthorized crossing between Lebanon and Israel.
However, despite this official confirmation, the mission has neither the jurisdiction nor the means to destroy these structures or to carry out arrests. Its contribution is limited to technical inspection, verification of facts, and informing the relevant authorities, before the Israeli army neutralized the tunnels itself. This episode fuels Israeli criticism of the mission’s operational limits.
Furthermore, security reality sometimes exceeds the UN: in a context where military and political dynamics go beyond the UN mandate, not everything can be controlled. Recent years have been marked by several important events, including a ceasefire agreement concluded on November 27, 2024, between Hezbollah and Israel. But like previous ceasefires, which were very fragile, the situation remains extremely volatile and incidents occur periodically.
A Faltering Truce: A Lull That Isn’t One in South Lebanon
Following the ceasefire, the mission sees its roles reaffirmed and the Lebanese army partially redeploys to the South.
In May 2025, direct fire hit a UNIFIL position—the first since the 2024 agreement. Reports of a resumption of regular hostilities are multiplying: airstrikes, artillery fire, armored movements… The civilian population is once again in danger, as are the Blue Helmets.
A hundred clandestine weapons caches were reportedly found. Weapons are still circulating. In this period of a “ghost” truce, incidents occur constantly.
During a demining operation in August 2025, an explosion occurred in the Wadi Zibqin area, resulting in several deaths among the soldiers of the Lebanese army.
One year before the end of the UNIFIL mandate, the Security Council’s decision to terminate the mission in late 2026 opens the way for a post-UNIFIL scenario, but this would imply an effective redeployment of the Lebanese army in the South.
An Indispensable Mission… Reaching Its End
UNIFIL did not bring definitive peace, but it avoided another war. It did not solve all the problems of South Lebanon, but it limited the risks of escalation. It did not resolve political issues, but it supported the Lebanese army and local communities during critical moments.
As the end of its current mandate approaches, the future of UNIFIL stands as one of the most sensitive—and most decisive—issues for Lebanon’s security. The Lebanese army remains limited to this day, constrained by its budgetary and logistical capacities, and above all blocked regarding the disarmament of militias. A national sovereignty that will have to assume the security of the South alone: a pressure that could accentuate internal divisions, particularly around the question of Hezbollah.
Today, Lebanon is preparing to enter a new era with a double challenge: taking back control of the security of the South and ensuring that the disengagement occurs without creating a vacuum exploitable by non-state actors. Despite the demons of history and the weight of geopolitics, a bet is placed: that of a Lebanon capable of maintaining its stability.
